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Race, partisan gerrymandering and the Constitution
or the most part, the Constitu
tion speaks in generalities. The
14th Amendment, for example,
instructs the states to provide all per·
sons the "equal protection of the
laws." But obviously, this cannot
mean that states are always forbid
den from treating a person differently
than any other person. Children can,
of course, be constitutionally barred
from driving, notwithstanding the
Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, there is a need within our
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constitutional system to refine the
Constitution's abstract provisions.
Otherwise, public officials and the
people would not know what is per
mitted and what is forbidden.
The process of refinement has de
volved principally (although not ex
clusively) to the courts. It is the
courts that have told us that the
Equal Protection Clause permits the
states to discriminate on the basis of
age in issuing driver's licenses, but
ordinarily does not permit the states

to treat persons differently on the ba
sis of their race.
In distilling abstract constitutional
provisions into more concrete "deci
sion rules," courts consider a number
of factors. One important factor is the
workability of the decision rules they
are imposing. Are they comprehensi
ble? Can they be applied with relative
ease, predictability and consistency?
Are they in fact likely to accomplish
the goals that animate them?
SEE CONSTITUTION 03

Using race as major factor in redistricting violates Equal Protection Clause
CONSMUTION FROM Dl

court's treatment of District
12.
To understand the prob
A recent Supreme Court
decision, CO<Yper v. Harris, re lem, one must bear three
veals serious workability is
things in mind.
First, under current
sues with the decision rules
Supreme Court precedent, a
governing how state legisla
tures must treat race and par state legislature's use of race
as a "predominant factor" in
tisan interests when they en
redistricting presumably vio
gage in congressional redis
lates the Equal Protection
tricting.
Clause.
Cooper involved constitu
Second, undercurrent
tional challenges to two North
Carolina congressional dis
Supreme Court precedent, a
tricts whose boundaries were state legislature faces no con
stitutional limitation on en
redrawn following the 2010
gaging in partisan gerryman
census.
The court unanimously up dering - i.e., intentionally re
districting so as to maximize
held a lower court judgment
the power of the controlling
concluding that the first dis
trict had been unconstitution political party and minimize
ally drawn, and voted 5-3
the power of the minority
(Justice Gorsuch did not par party.
Third, African American
ticipate in the case) to affirm
voters in North Carolina (as
the lower court's judgment
that the second district - Dis elsewhere) overwhelmingly
trict 12 - also was unconstitu vote for Democrats. Indeed,
tional. The workability issues African American voters in
arise in connection with the
North Carolina are more

likely to vote for Democrats
than voters who are regis
tered as Democrats.
Given these facts, what
happened in North Carolina
should come as no surprise.
The state legislature, which
was controlled by Republi
cans following the 2010 cen
sus, packed a large number of
African American voters into
District 12 - a district that
was already certain to elect a
Democrat - in order to pre
vent these voters from partici
pating in the election of repre
sentatives from other North
Carolina congressional dis
tricts.
District 12 was challenged
as unconstitutional on the
ground that the legislature
had used race as a predomi
nant factor in drawing it. The
state countered with a com
pletely different characteriza
tion of what had happened:
The legislature had done
nothing more than engage in

constitutionally permissible
and to the way in which the
partisan gerrymandering.
lower court had characterized
Yes, the state conceded,
the legislature's conduct. He
the legislature had intention
thought that the legislative
ally increased the number of
record made it absolutely
African American voters in
clear that the legislature's
District 12 for purposes of di
predominant motive was po
luting the impact of their
litical - i.e., "to pack the dis
votes. But it did not engage in trict with Democrats and thus
this action because of these
to increase the chances of Re
publican candidates in neigh
voters' race. Rather, it did so
boring districts."
because these voters were
highly likely to vote for
CO<Yper thus resolved the
Democrats.
constitutional challenge to
As noted above, the lower
North Carolina's District 12.
court agreed with the chal
But it really did not resolve
lengers and held District 12
the important constitutional
unconstitutional. By a 5-3
question raised by the case 
vote, a majority of the
whether state legislatures en
Supreme Court affirmed,
gaged in redistricting may in
largely on the ground that the tentionally draw district lines
record evidence - which con
in ways that impose electoral
tained a number of references disadvantages on racial
to race by new District 12's
groups that tend to vote in po
architects - supported the
litically monolithic ways. The
lower court's finding.
answer to the question raised
Justice Alito, writing for
in CO<Yper should be consis
himself and two others, took
tent across the country, re
strong exception to this ruling gardless of whether refer

ences to race or politics "pre
dominate" in a given state's
redistricting record.
One way that the court
could deal with the problem
would be to reconsider its
hands-off stance with respect
to whether the Constitution
imposes limits on partisan
gerrymandering. Interest
ingly, a case from Wisconsin
that is presently making its
way to the court could set the
stage for just such a reconsid
eration.
I will discuss this case, and
the court's approach to the
problem of partisan gerry
mandering, in my next Consti
tutional Connections column.
(John Greabe teaches con
stitutional law and related
subjects at the University of
New Hampshire School of
Law. He also serves on the
board of trustees of the New
Hampshire Institute for
Civics Education.)

